the state may take other steps to discourage women from choosing to have an abortion. This "restatement" admittedly describes a more limited right to abortion than that expressed by the Roe majority opinion. Even if one would favor the more "absolute" right endorsed in Roe, this restated abortion principle is the one that exists today. It is the only principle that can unify the holdings, if not the Justices' opinions, of the 1980's abortion cases. The reasonableness approach provides substantial protection for a woman's right to control her body. It is this limited, yet substantial, right that should be the focus of debate when the Court considers whether or not to overturn earlier abortion rulings.
Our thesis is that the Court should endorse openly the "rule of reason" for abortion regulations and, therefore, that it need not and should not overrule Roe v. Wade. We will present our argument in three stages. First, we will describe the reasonableness approach and how it was established by the holdings of the Supreme Court in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Second, we will survey the decisions of the states' highest courts and of the United States Courts of Appeals during the mid-1980's. This survey will demonstrate that the lower courts have successfully applied the reasonableness principle. Finally, we will explain why the Court should consider the older jurisprudential debate about the legitimacy of Roe irrelevant when it next considers the question of protecting the right to have an abortion subject to reasonable medical regulations.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE REASONABLENESS TEST
Writing in the early 1970's, Alexander Bickel was sharply critical of Roe v. Wade. 7 He considered Roe a reversion to the Court's abuse of substantive due process in the Lochner era, in part because of its inflexibility. The Roe opinion precluded any regulation of abortions during the first trimester and greatly restricted health regulations of other abortions. 8 "The state regulates and licenses restaurants and pool halls and Turkish baths and God knows what else in order to protect the public," Bickel observed, "why may it not similarly regulate and license abortion clinics, or doctors' offices where abortions 
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HeinOnline --76 Va. L. Rev. 521 1990 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 76:519 are to be performed?" 9 Professor Bickel based his assessment on a straightforward reading of Roe. And it may well have been an accurate assessment of Justice Blackmun's intention, given that he has been a frequent dissenter in the more recent abortion cases. 10 Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe seemed to create a virtually unlimited right to an abortion before the third trimester." The majority opinion in Roe seemed irreconcilable with Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Doe v. Bolton, which denied that the Court had created a right to "abortions on demand." 2 Lower courts initially took Justice Blackmun's opinion literally and invalidated all regulations of first trimester abortions and most regulations of second trimester abortions. 3 The Court soon made it clear, however, that Roe's statement about the states' inability to regulate first trimester abortions should not be taken literally. By the mid-1970's, the Court had upheld laws prohibiting non-physicians from performing abortions' 4 and laws requiring hospitals to keep confiden-9 A. Bickel, supra note 7, at 27. 10 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3067-79 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 494-504 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 11 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164: (a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. 16 including first-trimester abortions, even though the dissent complained that this requirement could raise the cost of an abortion by twenty percent. 17 By the mid-1980's, a more flexible judicial standard that accommodated reasonable government regulations of abortions clearly had replaced the rigid trimester approach of the Roe opinion.
By 1986, it was quite literally "black letter" or "hornbook" law that in pre-viability abortions Roe requires strict scrutiny only to determine if the regulation in question is a reasonable health regulation. I I As a complement to this rule, the Court on vagueness grounds also requires regulations, especially those with criminal penalties, to give doctors very clear notice as to whether or not an operation is permissible.' 9 Strict scrutiny applies only to laws focused on abortions; doctors must follow valid general regulation of medical procedures when performing abortions. 2°I n the 1980's, states also could regulate abortions to protect a possibly viable fetus as long as two conditions were met: first, the statute could not be so vague as to deter abortions of nonviable fetuses, and, second, the government had to allow an abortion if the doctor found a significant threat to the pregnant woman's life or health. 21 This reasonableness approach gives significant weight to the state's interest in protecting potential life. For example, the state may require that, during the abortion of a viable fetus, a second doctor be present to provide medical care for the child. 22 The Court, admittedly without a majority opinion, used the same type of reasonableness review for laws regulating abortions for minors. 23 Thus, an unemancipated minor's abortion can be delayed until her parents are notified, as long as the delay does not create any serious health risks. 24 The Court also has established clear rules regarding parental consent. A state law requiring parental consent is valid if, but only if, it allows the minor to obtain an abortion with the consent of a juvenile court judge. The judge must determine if the minor is mature enough to make the decision herself or, alternatively, if the abortion is in her best interests. In short, the rigid framework of the Roe opinion is long gone. Today, "Roe v. Wade" really stands for a much more flexible approach. Just as it has done in antitrust law, the Court has replaced a set of per se rules with the "rule of reason."
II. DOES THE "RULE OF REASON" WORK?
In his plurality opinion in Webster, Chief Justice Rehnquist complained of the unworkability of the Roe approach. To assess this complaint, we examined the published abortion decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals and the states' highest courts between July 23 As Justice Blackmun has argued, these decisions are probably inconsistent with the Roe opinion. 4shcroft, 462 U.S. at 503-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 24 
A. The Experience of the State Courts
Between July 1, 1986 and July 1, 1989, the highest courts of the fifty states and of the District of Columbia decided eleven cases that arguably could be called abortion decisions. We exempted from this compilation those cases that involved conflicts between proabortion and antiabortion groups, such as defamation actions brought by a member of one group against another or trespass actions brought against antiabortion protesters. 3 0 Similarly excluded are abortion malpractice and "wrongful birth" cases. 3 ' Of the remaining eleven cases, only two involved attacks on statutes that regulated abortions.
In Ex parte Anonymous, 32 the Supreme Court of Alabama unanimously upheld a parental consent statute that conformed to Bellotti II and Ashcroft. Without dissent, the Alabama judges also found that the particular minor was not mature enough to make her own decision. 3 They ruled six to three, however, that the abortion had not been shown to be against her best interest. 34 Thus, although the Alabama justices divided on the application of the statute, they appar- The Colorado Supreme Court, in a unanimous en banc opinion, disposed of the federal constitutional issues in a footnote, correctly concluding that the state provision did not conflict with the right of women to have abortions as defined by the Supreme Court in the 1980's. 37 Only these two cases involved any question of the validity of an abortion statute. The other nine state cases concerned the role of third parties in the abortion decision. In two cases the Indiana Supreme Court, with only one dissent, denied an injunction sought by the father of a fetus to prevent its abortion. 8 In a separate case, decided with a four paragraph summary ruling, the same court found that a state statute entitled a minor to an abortion because her mother had consented, even though her mother did not, in fact, have legal custody of the minor. 39 In two cases involving legally incompetent women, courts had to decide whether or not to order an abortion. In both cases, the Supreme Court's definition of a woman's right to privacy was considered, but Roe had little to do with the outcomes.' 39 In re P.R., 497 N.E.2d 1070 (Ind. 1986). Although a judicial order had placed the minor under the wardship of the County Department of Public Welfare, which had not consented to the abortion, the order did not completely terminate the mother's parental rights. Id. at 1070. The remaining four decisions that might arguably be termed "abortion cases" arose from disputes about abortion, but did not directly relate to the regulation of abortion rights. 4
B. Decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals
It appears to be more popular to attack abortion regulations in federal rather than state court. Ten federal appellate decisions involved the constitutionality of state abortion regulations. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on four of the ten cases.
4 2 Additionally, the courts of appeals decided several other cases involving abortionrelated topics. 
1986-87
In the three abortion cases decided in 1986 and 1987, the courts of appeals each time invalidated state abortion regulations. In Margaret S. v. Edwards, 44 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated a Louisiana law requiring that doctors advise women woman's decision to refuse medical treatment. The court initially decided the case even though the order had been complied with, the operation had been performed, and both the mother and child had died soon afterwards. The opinion was later withdrawn.
Because courts have on occasion ordered medical treatment for mentally retarded persons, it is difficult to determine if Roe v. Wade is critical to the Rhode Island Supreme Court's finding that a trial judge properly authorized an abortion for a profoundly retarded young woman whose pregnancy was brought about by a sexual assault. The supreme court in In re Doe, 533 A.2d 523 (R.I. 1987) (per curiam), upheld the trial court's selection of a "surrogate decisionmaker" to make the decision regarding the retarded young woman's pregnancy and to override objections from the biological mother of the mentally retarded pregnant child, in part because the mother had had only "slight and sporadic" contact with her retarded daughter over a period of several years. Id. at 526-27. 41 In one case, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that attorney's fees were not warranted, although attorneys representing a class of indigent women were successful in enjoining the state from restricting payments for abortions to patients eligible for state medical assistance. of their options regarding fetus burial or cremation. The same decision also invalidated a prohibition on fetal experimentation for being unconstitutionally vague. 45 The first ruling was a straightforward application of Akron. 4 Also on the basis of Akron, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit invalidated a statute regulating the disposal of fetal remains for being unconstitutionally vague. 4 7 Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that laws limiting access to abortions for inmates at a county correctional facility violated both Roe and the eighth amendment. 48 
1988
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari for all four of the federal appellate rulings decided in 1988, although one case has since been settled. 49 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 50 the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit" on four points. First, the Court found that the preamble to a Missouri statute declaring that life begins at conception as yet had had no significant effect on abortion rights and therefore did not present a ripe controversy. 5 2 Second, the Court upheld the statutory prohibition of the use of public facilities or employees to perform abortions, noting that nothing in the Constitution mandated either a state's participation in the business of providing abortions or a right of access to public facilities by private physicians and their patients seeking abortions. 5 3 Third, the Court unanimously held the prohibition against public funding of abortion counseling to be a moot issue. 5 4 And finally, accepting the state's interpretation, the Court left standing a statutory requirement that physicians conduct certain viability tests if they believed the tests to be necessary to make a viability determination. 5 Perhaps the lesson that federal appeals court judges should take from Webster is that courts should be more accepting of the state's interpretation of its own abortion laws. Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the majority of the Justices were willing to defer to the state's interpretation of its statute. Given the state's interpretation, the Missouri statute clearly was valid under the reasonableness approach.
Two other 1988 decisions relate to parental notification and consent requirements for abortions sought by minors. The Supreme Court will review both of these decisions in its October 1989 Term. In one decision, the Eighth Circuit upheld a statute requiring a forty-eight hour delay after parents are notified of a minor's intent to have an abortion. 5 6 The Supreme Court has not ruled previously on the validity of a post notification waiting period. Nevertheless, application of the reasonableness test should not be difficult. The question is whether or not the law reasonably promotes family decisions by court's analysis is debatable for two reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit refused to accept the state government's assertion that the medical regulations did not apply to first trimester abortions. 62 And second, the Seventh Circuit's detailed analysis of the medical basis for the regulations protecting the health of women may be inconsistent with the reasonableness approach that the Supreme Court has used in the 1980's.63 Nevertheless, the issues in this case were far from intractable. The Supreme Court would have needed only to determine if the health regulations at issue were reasonably related to the protection of the pregnant woman's health.
1989
There were three decisions in the first six months of 1989 concerning abortion regulations. 's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed clinics appears to comport with accepted medical practice, and leaves the method and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-with the physician and the patient."); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 429 n.11 (1983) ("Where the State adopts a health regulation governing the performance of abortions during the second trimester, the determinative question should be whether there is a reasonable medical basis for the regulation.").
The Seventh Circuit conceded that "[a] number of the regulations involved may well pass muster under the less stringent standard of review applied to state regulation of second trimester abortions." Ragsdale, 841 F.2d at 1368 n.8. Citing Simopoulos, the court observed that "some licensing of facilities performing second trimester abortions would be permissible." Id. at 1369 n.8. The court concluded, however, that this "nettlesome" issue was not before it, as the regulations at issue in Ragsdale made no distinction between first and second trimester abortions. Id 
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offering gynecological or obstetrical care. 67 The third decision in the spring of 1989 implicated both substantive due process and first amendment concerns. In Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 68 the First Circuit initially invalidated federal regulations banning recipients of federal funds from engaging in abortion-related activities, regardless of whether those activities involved federal funds. 6 9 Before withdrawing its opinion pending disposition of motions for rehearing, the court of appeals found that this restriction on privately funded abortion-related activities violated Roe, even under the reasonableness approach. The court also held that the attempt to suppress pro-choice advocacy by private groups receiving some federal funds violated the first amendment. Although difficult issues are presented by this case, they involve the proper application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 7 " rather than any particular obscurity in abortion law.
In addition to these ten cases, from 1986 to 1989 the courts of appeals also dealt with a number of cases that might not have existed but for the Supreme Court's establishment of a right to privacy, even though they were not truly abortion regulation cases. issues in these cases would survive even if Roe were overruled. 72 On the one hand, it is possible to argue that any area of the law in which the Supreme Court reviews almost half of the circuit court decisions must have something wrong with it. On the other, the Court's abortion decisions have not created an obvious burden on the lower courts, and the reasonableness standard usually has proved easy to apply.
III. THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DEBATE
The workability issue may seem mundane compared with the grand philosophical issues that have dominated the scholarly debate about abortion. Although that debate has obvious intellectual importance, it may be less significant to the choices now facing the Court. Thus, there is something to be said for Rehnquist's reluctance in Webster "to elaborate the abstract differences between a 'fundamental right' to abortion, ... a 'limited fundamental constitutional right,' .. or a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
'73
Roe sparked a heated jurisprudential debate about judicial review that continues to this day. Because the Court's action was so sweeping, Roe seemed to raise especially basic questions of institutional legitimacy. Unlike Griswold, 74 in which the Court struck down an aberrational ban on birth control, the Roe Court invalidated every abortion statute in the country. Because this pronouncement seemed to threaten a massive intrusion on legislative decisionmaking, it therefore required an extraordinarily powerful justification. One reason why the judicial debate has been so heated is the perception that deep Township, 864 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1988); and (6) challenges, on right to privacy grounds, by Medicare recipients to Social Security Act regulations restricting their ability to hire additional physicians at their own expense, see New York State Ophthalmological Soc'y v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2448 (1989) . The number of cases with "abortion-related issues" in the courts of appeals would rise if we included first amendment challenges to restrictions on the activities of antiabortion protestors.
72 For example, overruling Roe v. Wade would not affect the number of first amendment cases that arise because of the abortion issues. Right-to-privacy rulings only affect which group is more likely to be protesting, getting arrested, and challenging convictions under the first amendment. See also supra note 48.
73 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White and Kennedy, JJ.) (citations omitted). To the extent the distinction is relevant, we believe that abortion is a fundamental right. See Farber, supra note 3, at 1366-69. 74 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) .
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issues of constitutional theory are at stake. As we noted at the beginning of this Article, it was on this point that Justice Blackmun faulted the Webster plurality for slighting the issues. 75 Today, this jurisprudential debate seems much less urgent. Much of the debate has centered around whether or not any unwritten fundamental rights exist. Although that issue may continue to engage academics, as far as the Court is apparently concerned that philosophical battle is over.
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 76 illustrates the degree of judicial consensus on this point. The issue in Michael H. was whether or not California could deny all parental rights to a child's father on the ground that the mother was married to someone else when the child was born. 77 Although he rejected the father's claim, Justice Scalia did not reject the concept of fundamental rights in his plurality opinion. Rather, he said, "[it is an established part of our constitutional jurisprudence that the term 'liberty' in the Due Process Clause extends beyond freedom from physical restraint." 78 He quoted with approval Justice Powell's statement that "[o]ur decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. ' 79 Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Scalia's opinion in its entirety, while Justice O'Connor, in an opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote separately only to register her concern that Scalia's test for fundamental rights might be too narrow. 80 In short, the Court in Michael H. was virtually unanimous in recognizing the existence of some constitutional protection for fundamental rights. Notably, even Justice Scalia, the most vehement critic of Roe on the Court, agreed on the existence of some substantive fundamental rights. Thus, Rehnquist's refusal in Webster to join the "great debate" about the existence of fundamental rights is entirely understandable-as far as the judiciary is concerned, that debate has been resolved in favor of their existence.
Since Roe was decided, it also has become somewhat less important that the abortion right be classified as fundamental. Even if abortion is a fundamental right, the decisions of the 1980's make it clear that abortions are still subject to reasonable regulation. And if it is not a fundamental right, abortion regulations are subject to rational basis review. Rational basis review used to be a guarantee of constitutionality, but that is no longer true. Rather, the Court has found the absence of a rational basis in cases dealing with such diverse subjects as group homes for the mentally retarded, 2 property tax assessment, 8 3 and the taxation of life insurance companies. 84 If the Court considers the abortion right to be fundamental, abortion regulations will receive much more careful scrutiny even today, but we are no longer talking about the difference between extremely rigorous protection and no protection at all. 8 5 Rather, we may be talking about the difference between requiring abortion regulations to be quite reasonable and only requiring them to be somewhat reasonable-not an insignificant difference, but not jurisprudentially earthshaking either. Indeed in Webster itself the four dissenters argued that the fetal testing statute would fail even the rational basis test unless given Rehnquist's construction. 6 Consequently, Rehnquist may have been right in declining to debate whether abortion involves a fundamental constitutional right or a liberty interest.
Irrespective of labels, Chief Justice Rehnquist seems inclined to apply some type of reasonableness standard to abortion laws. If reasonableness were not required, it would be hard to understand his insistence on giving the Missouri statute a reasonable interpretationafter all, it would be constitutional even if it were unreasonable. Moreover, an important passage in his opinion suggests that unlimited regulation of abortion is not at all what he has in mind:
The dissent's suggestion that legislative bodies, in a Nation where more than half of our population is women, will treat our decision today as an invitation to enact abortion regulation reminiscent of the dark ages not only misreads our views but does scant justice to those who serve in such bodies and the people who elect them. 87 Although admittedly this passage is guarded, it does indicate that Rehnquist's views, properly understood, do not give carte blanche to state legislatures. 88 If the existence of an abortion right no longer seems such a pressing question to the Justices, perhaps it is in part because the reasonableness framework is not likely to intrude unduly on the democratic process. Because this framework is clearly attuned to the positions of the general public and the legal community, the Court's role is likely to consist primarily of policing aberrational legislation. Public opinion polls consistently show that both attorneys and members of the public strongly oppose complete bans on abortions but favor reasonable regulation. 89 In light of public opinion, the reasonableness framework does not present any major problem for state legislatures. Complete (or virtually complete) bans on abortion are unlikely in all 87 Id. at 3058 (emphasis added, citations omitted). We certainly do not argue that the Supreme Court should follow the opinion polls, as it has sometimes been said to follow the election returns. But there is something notably academic about castigating a court decision as a brutal assault on democracy, when that decision is actually fairly close to what a large majority of the population wants. This convergence of the rule of reason and public opinion is one reason, we think, why the fundamental rights debate-and with it the question of whether Roe was illegitimate, as opposed to merely wrong-now seems much less pressing to the Justices. Because the issue now is merely one of settling on the proper legal rule, rather than a basic issue of institutional legitimacy, a compromise solution seems more feasible.
Today, despite the fervor of the abortion debate, there is widespread agreement on three major points. First, the state has a valid interest in protecting women's health. Second, it also has a strong interest in protecting fetuses later in the pregnancy. Third, abortions cannot be banned completely. All three points have overwhelming public support, and a majority of the Justices apparently accept them. place if Justice Blackmun's view of Roe had prevailed. The surveys found that as many as 71% of adults favored requiring a woman under the age of 18 to receive her parents' consent before having an abortion. An Associated Press poll conducted in July 1989 showed that although adults support a woman's right to an abortion by a nearly 2-1 margin, 62% favored viability tests for a fetus after 20 weeks. Christian Sci. Monitor, July 25, 1989, at 8, col. 1.
The off-year elections in Virginia and New Jersey, following on the heels of the Webster decision, may indicate that staunch opponents of any right to have an abortion will face difficulties in upcoming elections. Both J. Marshall Coleman in Virginia and Jim Courter in New Jersey lost gubernatorial elections in which abortion rights were key issues. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at B14, col. 5.
In the furor of the abortion debate, however, it has been easy to lose sight of this common ground. Although this common ground admittedly leaves serious issues in dispute, a solid basis does exist for a reasonable resolution that can command widespread support.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the Justices believe that the only choices with respect to abortion are a complete overruling of Roe v. Wade or stringent judicial review of every medical regulation of abortion procedures, they may choose to dispatch abortion rights altogether. But there is another option: reject the strict review of abortion regulations and endorse a meaningful judicial role in preventing unreasonable legal barriers to women's access to abortions. Presented with this option, all but one or two of the Justices might endorse the continued judicial protection of a woman's right to control her reproductive system. This option has the advantage of roughly corresponding with public opinion, so that the Court rarely should have to invalidate legislation with strong majoritarian support.
The Supreme Court forged, although never acknowledged openly, the doctrinal basis for this middle ground in its decisions since the late 1970's. It is a doctrine that our survey indicates is both easily understood and readily applied by the courts of appeals and the states' highest courts. With the fading of the judicial debate on fundamental rights, the Court is now free to turn from broad jurisprudential issues toward the more practical task of applying this reasonableness standard.
We do not claim prophetic powers. The Court's decisions of the last decade could provide the basis for announcing a workable judicial approach to abortion law. Whether the Justices will take advantage of that opportunity remains to be seen.
